The cabinet’s major headache was how to quell the mutiny yet the young country had no military of it’s own. At the time, Kenya had only three small military battalions under command of the departing British. But the British also had two purely expatriate units in Nanyuki and Nairobi with more fire-power than the Kenyan battalions. However, there was a standing agreement that British military units not interfere with internal Kenyan matters unless with explicit invitation of the new African government.
At the Gatundu cabinet meeting, the cabinet authorised Kenyatta to go ahead and request the British units to move in and quell the mutiny at Lanet. The British agreed to Kenyatta’s request but demanded that Kenyatta’s deputy, Oginga Odinga, be kept out of any security-related discussions involving Kenya and Britain. The man who had staged the coup in Zanzibar, “Field-Marshal” Okello, was a close associate of Odinga. It was also an open secret that while Kenyatta was negotiating with UK, US, and the Israelis to equip and train the new Kenya military, Odinga was making parallel arrangements with the eastern bloc countries – mainly Russia, East Germany and Bulgaria.
With British intervention, the mutiny at Lanet was easily contained just like another that took place in mainland Tanzania a week later. The Americans now saw a better opportunity for a more forceful presence in the East African region where they felt the British were being a bit casual in countering Communist influence. US ambassador to Kenya at the time, William Attwood, cabled the State Department to report that “a communist Zanzibar would serve as a base for subversive and insurgency operations against the mainland from Kenya to the Cape (South Africa).” US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, agreed and told a Senate committee on foreign affairs: “The state department is seriously concerned that Zanzibar may be drawn into the communist camp and introduce cold war in the key Africa region.
I believe it is most desirable that we consult on an urgent basis with the UK and the East African governments on specific means to remove communists in Zanzibar.” The US Foreign Secretary suggested two ways to handle he crisis: One, direct military intervention, and two, isolating the radicals in Zanzibar and putting the islands in a union government with mainland Tanzania “ In arguing his case, the Foreign Secretary said: “The coup and the mutinies in East Africa have proved to the reluctant British that at one point military intervention should be the answer to the communist influx in the region. As for Kenyatta and Nyerere, the fact they had to invite British soldiers to come to their rescue is enough reason to make them support military intervention in Zanzibar.” The second option worked.
The radicals were pushed into a political corner and Zanzibar formed a union government with mainland Tanzania. The option for US military invasion in Zanzibar was foreclosed. President Jomo Kenyatta very first Christmas after independence – December 25, 1963 – was messed up when on that day, Somali bandits (Shiftas) butchered 40 Kenyans – four of them administration police – at the Wajir/Tana- River border. On the Boxing Day, the cabinet convened and declared a state of emergency in the North Eastern province, Tana-River, Isiolo and Marsabit districts. The background to the attack was that a few months to Kenya independence, the Somalis in North Eastern Kenya had overwhelmingly voted in a referendum to have North Eastern province cede to join Somalia.
The Kenyatta government, however, had said a decisive NO to the demand and declared that any Somali in North Eastern Kenya who wished to be a Somali citizen was free to change citizenship and cross the border as an individual, but NE province would remain in Kenya. A section of Somalis responded by forming a guerrilla army to enforce their demands on the Kenya government.
They had tacit, and later open backing, of the Somali government. When designing their national flag at the granting of their independence in July 1960, the Somalis deliberately put in it five stars to represent what they regarded their rightful territory. It included the former British protectorate of Somali-land (now the Punt-Land), the former Italian territory of Somali (the present Somalia), the French Somaliland (now Djibouti), the Somalispeaking Ethiopian province of Ogaden, and Somali-dominated Northern Eastern province of Kenya. The Kenyatta government encountered great problems tackling the Shifta because they were not fighting a conventional war.
They would make lighting attacks on villages at night and butcher tens of civilians. During daytime, they would ambush government officers and other travellers in the difficult terrain that was, and still is, North Eastern province. It was also complicated by the fact that even in the villages, it was hard to tell who were or weren’t collaborators with the Shifta. Then the Shifta took the battle to a whole new level when they turned to mine warfare and blew up three truckloads laden with Kenya Army men. Kenyatta promptly ordered his Defence minister, Dr Njoroge Mungai, to call an international press conference to announce that Kenya was declaring war on Somalia itself. “Henceforth, we are not going to pursue shadowy bandits. We are taking the war right to Mogadishu. That is where the real enemy is”, Kenya declared.
The Kenyatta government further stated it was no longer interested in any diplomatic interventions and “will henceforth speak the language of war which is the only language the Shiftas and their backers in Mogadishu understand”. But internally, Kenyatta government came up with what was called “The 4-Point-Approach.” Besides taking the shooting battle to Mogadishu, the Kenya government would wage an aggressive propaganda war to woo Kenyan Somalis on it’s side. Besides, tangible development projects would be initiated in North Eastern province to convince residents that they were better off in Kenya than in Somalia. Lastly, the Kenya government would pursue diplomatic channels but strictly on it’s own terms. Where propaganda is concerned, it was discovered that the ordinary Kenyan Somali living in North Eastern Kenya had access only to Radio Mogadishu, and not the Voice of Kenya (now KBC) radio in Nairobi.
As a result, the Kenyan Somalis only knew Kenya from the perspective of what the authorities in Mogadishu wanted them to know – a perfect case of only Radio Hyena broadcasting in the land of the sheep! From Radio Mogadishu, Kenya Somalis only heard about repressive “nywele ngumu” (hard-haired people) living in Nairobi who wanted to rule them against their wish. To reach Kenya Somalis in North Eastern province, the national broadcaster, the only broadcaster in the country at the time – was instructed to open a channel to be heard in North Eastern Kenya. That is how Eastern FM based in Garissa came into being. It still exists as one of the satellite stations operated by the state broadcaster, KBC.
But another problem cropped up. There were not many good Somali-speaking broadcasters in Kenya. And even when they were found, the State security intelligence couldn’t clear them as their allegiance was to Somalia and not Kenya. Eventually non-Somali speaking Kenyans had to be put on a crash-programme to know the language and work at the Eastern FM station. Using the Eastern FM, the propaganda spewed by Radio Mogadishu would effectively be countered as soon as it hit the airwaves. Better still, Kenya Somalis were for the first time able to interact with other Kenyans via the airwaves which gave them a sense of belonging. Propaganda aside, tangible projects began to be initiated in North Eastern projects, including commissioning of boreholes and health clinics. Somalia which had now began to feel the heat of Kenya’s offensive, called for a negotiated truce.
Kenya agreed but on condition that Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Sellassie be the mediator. Somalis rejected him on argument that he was Kenyatta’s personal friend. A mediator acceptable to both parties was finally found in Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda. Dar es Salaam would be venue for the talks where it was resolved that both sides cease combat. On February 20, 1969, President Kaunda and Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Egal came to Nairobi for official signing of the protocols that ended the Shifta war. The same afternoon, President Kenyatta announced the end of the state of Emergency in North Eastern province.
- The People
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