BY JEFFREY LEWIS
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| Kim Jong Un |
The big news, Hagel announced, was that the United States will add 14 ground-based interceptors to the ground-based midcourse missile defense (GMD) system in Alaska.
We can disagree about how much to spend on what used to be called "national" missile defense (as opposed to point defenses against theater missiles), but does anyone think it's a good idea to spend more money on the current GMD system at Fort Greely, a.k.a. the Disasta' in Alaska, a.k.a. the Blunda' in the Tundra?
As we have discussed in this space before, a recent National Academies panel -- stacked with many long-time supporters of missile defense -- recommended completely replacing the current system with brand-new interceptors, new radars, and a new concept of operations. But I am getting ahead of myself.
Let's start with the reason for reorienting the U.S. missile defense program: North Korea's evolving ballistic missile threat. While the press focuses on North Korea's December satellite launch using an Unha rocket, defense wonks are quietly fretting about a totally different missile. Last year, North Korea paraded six missiles that sure looked like intercontinental ballistic missiles through Kim Il Sung Square. North Korea calls the missile the Hwasong-13, although the Western press calls it the KN-08.
The Unha rocket that North Korea launched in December would struggle to get a nuclear warhead all the way to the continental United States; the KN-08 however is a different kettle of fish. (Sorry Alaska, you're hosed either way. It's not my fault you are so close that Sarah Palin can see Russia from her house.)
The public reaction to the KN-08 was muted -- possibly because Bob Gates spent his last few months in office telling everyone he could that North Korea was about to show off a road-mobile ICBM. (This artful setting of expectations is one of the myriad ways by which Gates distinguished himself as one of our most deft public servants.) Well, that and because reporters routinely confuse the KN-08 with the Unha. The Japanese press, for example, ran a story claiming the Unha rocket was the Hwasong-13, despite the fact that North Korea conveniently labels its missiles with little plaques to the contrary.
Close examination of the KN-08 missiles themselves seemed to indicate they were mockups, rather than the real article. Those of us who lean toward wonky interests had a very interesting, though perhaps not terribly productive, discussion whether these missiles were better described as "fakes" or "missile simulators" that would be followed by real missiles.
Admiral Winnefeld had a chance to provide the authoritative view of the U.S. intelligence community during last week's presser, but punted:
Q: But do you know if that that KN-08 is a real or a fake missile? And do you know whether it has the range to reach the United States?
ADM. WINNEFELD: We would probably want to avoid the intelligence aspects of that. But -- but we believe the KN-08 probably does have the range to reach the United States and the -- our assessment of -- of where it exists in its lifetime is something that would remain classified.
Hey, it's a good thing you're not asking us to spend like a billion dollars here in the middle of fiscal austerity, or I might get sort of annoyed that you don't want to tell me why.
Oh, wait, you are asking us to spend a billion dollars in the middle of fiscal austerity. That's right, when asked how much the 14 new interceptors would cost, Jim Miller said "it'll be a little bit less than a billion dollars overall." Pretty soon we'll be talking about real money. (A lot of scratched our heads at how 14 interceptors could cost nearly a billion dollars. George Lewis, writing on the blog Mostly Missile Defense, breaks out the likely cost factors if you are interested.)...Read full article http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/20/billion_dollar_baby?page=0,1
